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1. Do you think that narratology has entered a phase of  consolidation? If  yes, what does this 
consolidation consist of ? What do you consider to be the most important aspect to pursue with the aim of  
consolidation? 
 
I am not convinced that narratology in the sense of  a theory of  narrative has entered a 
phase of  consolidation. The main reason for this standpoint is that narratology, once 
defined by Todorov as «la science du récit», the science of  narrative, has not in its actual 
form, or rather forms in the plural, made clear what it is a science of (‘science’ interpreted 
in the widest possible sense). Up to now narratology has not distinguished itself  for 
penetrative meta-theoretical reflection, and the lack of  such reflection I see as a serious 
shortcoming. In natural science one can point at the material world and state that here is 
the object; and the unequalled success of  this enterprise provides a kind of  answer to 
what is meant both by ‘science’ and ‘the material world’. The narratological enterprise, 
on the other hand, is operating within the realm of  intentionality, the domain of  meaning 
rather than of  matter. The terms that constitute its nucleus, narrative and story, do not 
denote material things, i.e., such things that are unaffected by how they are talked about; 
instead, what these words mean is entirely up to how speakers use them in actual 
contexts. Recognizing this condition might help us come to a better understanding of  
what would possibly consolidate narratology as a discipline. 
What labels such as «the science of  narrative» or «the theory of  narrative» really stand 
for may be rather obscure. To come to some insight the best one can do is looking at 
practice. By contemplating what the narratological pioneers actually did in their 
reasoning from chosen concrete examples, one can get a fairly good idea of  what they 
intended by narratology. Its scope was rather limited, as it appears. One can make out 
from their practice that the aim was mainly to develop the project of  poetics in a more 
systematic way than had been done earlier. The opening paragraph of  Roland Barthes’ 
“Introduction”, with its examples of  the «innombrables récits» (countless narratives), has 
by narratologists again and again been quoted as an argument for the general scope of  the 
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narratological approach. But looking at what Barthes is actually saying reveals that his 
topic was nothing less than what can be associated with the popular (not the technical) 
notion of  story. These «innombrables […] récits du monde» (countless narratives of  the 
world) are such exciting, entertaining, imaginative semiotic creations that we appreciate 
with an attention that is obviously closer to aesthetic pleasure than to, for instance, 
assimilation of  factual information. 
Even if  these early narratologists did not explicitly reflect on the difference between a 
theory whose object is the external world and one whose aim is to characterize sets of  
rule-governed human activities within the internal world of  meaning, their choice of  method 
came to be in harmony with such an insight. Making the study of  stories more 
systematic was to make the implicit ‘grammar’ of  such meaning-systems explicit. In my 
view it wouldn’t be unreasonable to think of  such an enterprise coming to a state of  
consolidation at least as a sub-discipline of  some subjects covering a wider area of  
topics. Comparisons with the rules constraining other systems would give opportunities 
to broaden the perspective. One may, for example, ask whether the ‘grammar’ of  an 
informative report of  actual events differs from the ‘grammar’ that constrains the type of  
stories narratologists had as their primary object. Language use is not of  much help here, 
because in some contexts both types of  discourse might be referred to as narrative. But if  
one discourse is taken to be a verbal account about the thing and the other just a 
construction about the saying, it could be expected that their rule-systems display 
significant differences. And if  such differences are also shown by good arguments to be 
there, one might regard such an insight as a contribution to a ‘theory of  narrative’. 
However, a strategy like the one described as being open to the narratological 
pioneers was not taken on by the theorists representing the next step of  narratology’s 
evolution. Instead the theory went into a ‘definitional’ phase, obviously motivated by a 
feeling of  the obligation to match up to the label «a science of  narrative». Science was now 
taken in a more literally sense than Todorov had intended. One obviously had the feeling 
that something claiming the status of  a science should at least have a definable object. 
Narratology, it was now argued, should demonstrate «what all and only narratives have in 
common». By taking on that attitude, one got to embrace a strategy that tended to treat 
narratives and stories as things, as ‘natural kinds’, made up by their inherent constituting 
properties. Theorists embarked on a kind of  reasoning about what constituted ‘narrative 
kinds’ as if  it were something analogous to how, for example, organic matter is 
constituted by cells built up by carbon composites. The task became to lay bare such 
stuff  as stories are made of. It’s true that ‘grammar’ talk did not stop – but it was one 
‘grammar’ that was stipulated as ruling all narratives, (and the category should be 
understood as including a lot more than what the pioneers had attended to), namely the 
grammar regulating informative referential accounts: telling what happened. From that 
paradigm one stipulated a whole catalogue of  question-begging technical concepts taken 
to be constitutive of  the narrative theory as such. 
However, this strategy involved as a necessary consequence that one turned one’s 
back to the approach I have seen implicit in the pioneers’ way of  doing narratology, that 
is, as an attempt to make narrative poetics more systematic. Instead of  regarding that 
stance as limiting, I took it as opening towards other rule-systems which could be 
compared and contrasted with the focused one. Such a method would be congenial with 
the view that the object of  a ‘theory of  narrative’ should not be thought of  as something 
thing-like with inherent constitutive properties but rather as human rule-governed actions in 
social and cultural contexts. As having their right place in contexts of  intensionality, not 
extensionality, the core terms of  narratology, narrative and story, should be construed as 
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patterns of  discursive processes, which explains why they are context-dependent. Therefore, 
one of  the pitfalls we should avoid as narratologists is to borrow strategies and ways of  
reasoning from domains foreign to the nature of  the kind of  subject we are trying to 
elucidate. This could also be understood as my answer to question 3b.  
 
 
What do you consider to be the most important aspect to pursue with the aim of  consolidation? 
 
As I have tried to explain above, it would be to consider the nature of  the kind of  
questions that constitute the topic of  an enterprise calling itself  a theory of  narrative. 
And the thesis is that we should recognize such enterprise as attempts to theorize on 
something that has to do with discursive action and not with discourse-independent things. 
This suggests that there is not much point in constructing definitions, if  this should 
mean just stipulating constituting properties. 
 
 
2a. Does diversification imply more double entry narratologies (cognitive n., feminist n., unnatural n., 
etc.)? If  yes, what is still missing for a more complete account of  narrative phenomena? 
 
In my view, a double entry narratology of  the type unnatural narratology brings in a side-
track within standard narratology as a theory of  narrative in general. My impression is 
that the ‘unnatural’ narratologists start from a position where the standard theory is 
taken for granted and then argue that it should be supplemented by the addition of  
analyses of  some motifs and techniques to which it has paid little attention. If  anything 
should speak in favour of  that impression, one can say that what is questioned is not the 
attribute unnatural but the word qualified by it, namely narratology. If  it is just certain 
motifs and techniques that are characterized as ‘unnatural’ in comparison with some 
more common types taken as the ‘natural’ choices, then the very theory of  narrative 
seems to be left untouched. However, narratology should be interpreted as a theory of  
narrative as such, not elements of  narratives’ content. Accordingly, unnatural narratology as 
it is practiced would rather be interpreted as a study of  unnatural contents of  narratives 
than as the claim that narrative theory presupposes an unnatural logic. 
As to cognitive narratology a rather different question is at issue. Looking at how the 
cognition theorists argue, I can rather quickly see that neither narrative nor theory could 
possibly have the same meaning as that I ascribed to the early narratologists’ reasoning. 
The object of  cognitive theorizing seems to be some modern variant of  what Immanuel 
Kant once saw as a priori intuitions, for instance the ideas of  space and time, by which 
we organize our sensory inputs into knowledge. Such intuitions represent the form of  
experience rather than its content which is given practical comprehensibility through that 
form. In modern cognitive theory it is often argued that one such experience-shaping 
form stands out as being of  particular importance for us as humans; most of  our 
experiences appear to be organized through its agency, and in some sense we also seem 
to have our very ‘humanity’ defined by it. Whatever such a form might be, cognitive 
theorists refer to it as narrative and story, obviously suggesting that we shall associate it 
with the meaning these terms have in contexts like those I took to be relevant for the 
early narratology. The idea is that the characteristic way in which we as humans make 
sense of  the world reveals that we are ‘storytelling animals’, ruled by a ‘literary mind’. 
However, if  having taken one’s point of  departure in the hypothesis that the main 
aim of  these theorists is to explain the functions of  our cognitive abilities and processes, 
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there doesn’t seem much of  a point in giving the terms narrative and story the meaning 
they are given in the narratological context. Cognitive theory should not be understood 
as walking hand in hand with poetics. If  we took it for granted that we could use the 
meaning we associated with the narratological context here, the result would certainly be 
consternation. In consequence, a cognitive narratology and a narratology starting from 
the perspective of  poetics could not reasonably be parts of  something regarded as a 
consolidated theoretical unit. 
 
 
2b. Or does diversification, perhaps simultaneously, involve a look at the various scientific cultures 
underlying research programs in narrative theory, past and present, but also non-Western?  
 
I don’t know how to interpret this question to do full justice to it. An expression such as 
«the various scientific cultures underlying research programs in narrative theory» seems 
to me to be question-begging. If  a practice could be described as indicating a ‘culture’, it 
sounds contradictory to describe it simultaneously as ‘scientific’, if  one’s point of  
departure does not happen to be sociological. But if  it so were, then the term narrative 
theory will not be taken de re, that is, as something one is prepared to seriously recognize 
as such a thing. It will only be taken de dicto, as a quotation of  what people within this or 
that ‘culture’ are prepared to call ‘narrative theory’. This ambiguity would be a reflection 
of  what I have seen as the problem with the whole question discussed here of  the 
consolidation of  narrative theory as one consistent unity. 
 
 
As theoreticians address issues of  cognition and context in narrative, in what ways should the role of  
poetics and rhetoric in narratology be rethought? 
 
The core of  my discursive approach with regard to topics especially in the humanities 
has been that we should accept the consequences of  the insight that such topics are 
regulated within the realm of  meaning. The object of  modern cognitive theory, though, 
is not just the mind as the domain of  thoughts but also the necessary material condition 
of  thinking, namely the neural system. But however far research in what happens in that 
system in an individual’s constructing and receiving acts of  storytelling will come, it will 
not, as it seems, overthrow the intentional talk by which we in appreciations and in 
discourse make sense of  such performances. There is nothing indicating that it would be 
possible, without un-informative reductionism, to convincingly argue that one has found 
a discourse type where descriptions of  neural processes on the one hand, and analyses 
of  how themes are suggested by plot construction in a story on the other, are really 
interchangeable. 
 
 
3a. With respect to question 2, what contributions can each narratology or narrative theory bring to the 
others? To what extent can concepts and methods travel and be shared among different theories? And 
between narratology and other disciplines? 
 
With regard to topics within the humanities and related fields, a main theme of  my 
discussion has been that there is incompatibility between theories because their concepts 
and methods are strictly context-dependent. In this there is a significant difference 
between natural science on the one hand and scholarship in the cultural disciplines on 
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the other. Science has one consistent object, the material universe, and what are 
formulated as hypotheses in chemistry, for example, should be expected to be 
compatible with theories of  physics. In scholarly discussions of  topics like narrative 
theory, traveling of  concepts between systems is rather to be regarded as something 
which creates typical pitfalls. What cognitive theory refers to as storytelling will not make 
sense if  we take it to mean what it means in the context of  poetics. In my opinion, what 
can contribute to insights is the possibility of  contrasting one practice to others. In the 
more internal discussion of  narratology, there is much to get from seeing the contrast 
between a reasoning built on the aesthetic paradigm of  poetics and one that is built on 
the paradigm of  informative reports of  actual events and circumstances (that which I 
have claimed is the paradigm preferred by standard narratology). In other words, 
possible insights could be expected to come into view, not by having different systems to 
merge into one superior arrangement, but from the distinctions we can make between 
them. In this operation of  getting meaning by differences, we can see the analogy with 
how language operates as a system; and we can suggest that this operation is typical of  
human discursive practices in general as contrasted with the condition of  matter. And, 
after all, from this analogy the narratological pioneers started their project. 
